This paper examines the endogenous formation of risk sharing networks in the rural Philippines. We show that geographic proximity is a major determinant of interpersonal relationships. We …nd little evidence that people form relationships to pool income risk.
Introduction
In an in ‡uential paper, Granovetter (1985) argued that market transactions should not be viewed as anonymous and impersonal but as embedded in a web of inter-personal relationships. Granovetter based his conclusion upon years of research on labor markets and business relationships in the US. Granovetter (1995) showed, for instance, that most jobs are obtained through some kind of referral process, the reliability of which is often based on prior acquaintance. Following
Granovetter's work, many researchers in economics and other social sciences have documented the importance of relational contracting (e.g. Bernstein 1992 , Bernstein 1996 , Johnson, McMillan & Woodru¤ 2002 and the role that networks of interpersonal relationships play in the circulation of information (e.g. Barr 2000 , Foster & Rosenzweig 1995 , Romani 2003 , Bandiera & Rasul 2002 . Fafchamps (2004) and Fisman (2003) have shown that prior acquaintance plays a paramount role in market exchange in African manufacturing because it forms the basis for trust. The importance of personal relationships has also been documented in agricultural trade (e.g. Meillassoux 1971 , Shapiro 1979 , Fafchamps & Minten 1999 , Fafchamps & Minten 2002 .
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the e¤ect of interpersonal relationships on economic transactions.
Much theoretical work has been done on networks by sociologists who have started thinking about networks as early as the 1960's (Mitchell 1969 ) and modeling them using graph theory (e.g. Raub & Weesie 1990 , Weesie & Raub 2000 . More recently, networks have begun receiving attention from economic theorists. Bala & Goyal (2000) and Goyal, van der Leij & MoragaGonzalez (2004) , for instance, have studied the relationship between network architecture and underlying incentives. Kranton & Minehart (2001) have examined the restrictions on exchange that network relationships place on exchange. Genicot & Ray (2003) and Bloch, Genicot & Ray (2004) have examine the conditions under which speci…c network architectures are stable with 1 respect to individual and group deviations. Recent progress has also been made -primarily by epidemiologists or under their impetus -in the modeling of large networks (Vega-Redondo 2004) .
Development economists have long suspected that intrapersonal relationships help shape economic exchange and agrarian institutions (e.g. Basu 1986 , Bardhan 1984 . This is probably because formal institutions often are weak and must be supplemented by interpersonal trust (Fafchamps 2005 ). This appears particularly true for risk sharing which, in addition to selfinsurance via precautionary saving, has been shown to be a fundamental risk coping mechanism for the rural poor (e.g. Rosenzweig 1988 , Townsend 1994 , Ligon, Thomas & Worrall 2001 , Ligon, Thomas & Worrall 2000 , Fafchamps 2003 . The pooling of idiosyncratic risk remains primarily informal in much of the developing world (e.g. Fafchamps 1992 , Coate & Ravallion 1993 , Foster & Rosenzweig 2001 . In addition to risk sharing within households (e.g. Rosenzweig & Stark 1989 , Dercon & Krishnan 2000 , transfers and inter-personal loans constitute primary channels of risk pooling (Udry 1994) . Transfers and interpersonal loans travel have been shown to travel primarily along interpersonal networks (e.g. Ellsworth 1989 , Lucas & Stark 1985 .
In this paper we study the e¤ect of pre-existing relationships on subsequent gifts and transfers, controlling for shared characteristics. Our empirical investigation is based on survey data collected in rural Philippines for the purpose of studying risk sharing. Using these data, Fafchamps & Lund (2003) have indeed shown that informal gifts and loans serve a risk sharing purpose but also that the extent of risk sharing appears limited by the extent of interpersonal networks. Here we examine the factors determining the formation of risk sharing network and the extent to which these networks de facto shape subsequent gifts and loans.
We show that geographic proximity is a major determinant of interpersonal relationships.
We only …nd weak evidence that people form such relationships to explicitly diversify risk and maximize gains from risk pooling. The existence of a pre-existing relationship between two indi-viduals is a major determinant of subsequent gifts and informal loans between them, controlling for other proximity factors. From this we conclude that these transfers and informal loans are embedded in interpersonal relationships. These relationships are largely determined by proximity factors and are only weakly the result of purposeful diversi…cation of income risk. There is, however, some evidence that the formation of risk sharing links is aimed at pooling health risk.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by developing a simple model of the formation of risk sharing arrangements between pairs of agents. We use it to derive testable hypotheses that are suited to the data at hand. Econometric issues are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the data and its main characteristics. Econometric results are discussed in detail in Section 5.
Conceptual framework
To motivate the empirical analysis, we begin by constructing a simple model of relationship formation. Consider two individuals i and j. The cost to i of establishing a relationship with j increases with the distance d ij between i and j:
We interpret distance as a K-dimensional vector d ij = fd 1 ij ; :::; d K ij g that includes dimensions such as spatial distance, family relatedness, shared activities and religion, similar age and gender, etc.
The idea is that it is easier to establish -and maintain -a relationship with people who are close in some important respect. We thus assume that C 0 0 for all d k ij and C 0 > 0 for k 2 P K.
Which dimensions of proximity belong in practice to subset P is an empirical question that we wish to investigate econometrically.
3
A relationship with j generates bene…ts B i to i. 1 We assume that bene…ts depend on the distance between i and j:
where L ij = 1 if there is a link between them, and zero otherwise. If a link is bene…cial, we
If a link is essential for any bene…t to be achieved, then
In many economic situations of interest, gains from trade are largest between economic agents with di¤erent endowments. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the bene…t derived from a link increase with distance, i.e., that
One possible example that we investigate in the empirical section is mutual insurance: gains from risk pooling between two individuals i and j are higher the less (positively) correlated the incomes of i and j are. For this reason, we expect mutual gains from risk sharing to be lower if both individuals have the same occupation. We also note that sensitivity to health shocks depends, among other things, on age and gender: two individuals of the same age and gender are more likely to be a¤ected by similar illnesses than individuals who di¤er a lot. As a result, the pooling of health risk should be more e¤ective between individuals that are least similar.
Provided suitable data are available, these issues can be investigated directly by estimating equation (2.2) to ascertain whether the bene…t from a link indeed increases with distance.
We are also interested in endogenous network formation. We observe that, other things being equal, it is in the interest of individual i to incur the cost of establishing a link L ij with j if:
We thus have L ij = 1 if G(d ij ) 0 and L ij = 0 otherwise. Factors that raise G thus make it more likely that G 0 and thus that a link is formed. It follows that, other things being equal, In practice, choices are also a¤ected by random unobservable factors, say e ij . Adding a random component to inequality (2.3) yields a dichotomous regression model of the form:
Coupled with a distributional assumption regarding e ij and a functional form for B(:) and C(:), 
Econometric issues
Regression models (2.2) and (2.4) are both of the form:
where i and j are individuals, Y ij is an N N matrix, and X ij is a series of N N matrices.
The Y ij and X ij matrices may be symmetric or directional (asymmetric). Network analysis naturally leads to regression models of this form. In such models, it is in general reasonable to assume that E[u ij ; u ik ] 6 = 0 for all k and E[u ij ; u kj ] 6 = 0 for all k. 3 Applying OLS to (3.1) yields consistent coe¢ cient estimates, but OLS standard errors are inconsistent, leading to incorrect inference.
Robust standard errors must correct for two-way clustering along the columns and the rows of u ij . To obtain such robust standard errors, we apply the method developed by Conley (1999) to deal with spatial correlation of errors. 4 Conley's method is an extension of the robust covariance matrix popularized by White and extended to time series by Newey and West. Applied to network data, the method allows for arbitrary cross-observation correlation in the error terms involving similar individuals. The only structure imposed on the covariance structure is that
Carlo simulations suggest that the standard error correction can be extremely large in the case of network data, so that the correction of standard errors is essential when analyzing network data.
Other methods have been devised to conduct inference on network data. One such method relies on permutation methods popularized by Good (2000) . This method was …rst applied to network analysis by Hubert & Schultz (1976) and subsequently re…ned by Krackhardt (1987) and Nyblom, Borgatti, Roslakka & Salo (2003) . 5 Permutation methods come in di¤erent ‡avors, depending on how the null hypothesis is simulated. 6 While these di¤erent ‡avors have performed slightly di¤erently in Monte Carlo 4 This is achieved by modifying the stata ado …les available on Conley's website. 5 See also (e.g. Krackhardt 1992 , Krackhardt 1988 . 6 Let us illustrate these di¤erent ‡avors with the standard OLS model of the form:
with N observations and classical assumptions on the errors. The …rst step is to estimate the model using OLS and obtain b . Then we create an arti…cial sample of N observations by permutating the Yi's so that they no longer correspond to the Xi. This preserves the correlation between the Xi's but destroys any possible correlation between Yi and Xi. For each arti…cial sample, obtain b (n) . Replicate this M times. This generates a Monte Carlo distribution of b under the null hypothesis that all = 0. We then count how many b (n) are larger, in absolute value, than b . Let this number be H. The p value of b is H=M . This kind of permutation method goes by the name of Y -permutations in the literature.
Other null hypotheses can be tested in the same way. For instance, suppose we wish to test whether the simulations, they should all be asymptotically equivalent. To apply this method to network data, we need to correct for possible correlation between observations. This is accomplished by restricting the set of permutations so that if the i and j rows of Y ij are permuted, then the i and j columns of Y ij are permuted as well. This procedure is known as Quadratic Assignment
Procedure or QAP in the literature (Hubert & Schultz 1976) . 7 In addition to robust standard errors, we also report p-values obtained through permutation methods to further verify the robustness of our …ndings. Following the sociology literature, QAP p-values are calculated using a linear probability model.
The data
Having presented the conceptual framework and discussed econometric issues, we now describe the data. A survey was conducted in four villages in the Cordillera mountains of northern Philippines between July, 1994 and March, 1995 (Lund 1996 . A random sample of 206 rural household was drawn after taking a census of all households in selected rural districts. These households are dispersed over a wide area; most can only be reached by foot. Three interviews were conducted with each household at three month intervals between July 1994, just after the annual rice harvest, and March 1995, after the new rice crop had been transplanted. Sample coe¢ cients 1 of a subset of the regressors X 1 are not signi…cant. Let the OLS estimates be written b
1
. Two methods have been proposed in the literature to deal with this case. In the …rst method, called partialling, we partition the regressors into two groups, X 1 and X 2 . We then regress Y on X 2 and obtain residuals u yx 2 . We also regress X 1 on X 2 and obtain a series of residuals u x 1 x 2 . It is well known that regressing u yx 2 on u x 1 x 2 yields b 1 . To test whether b 1 = 0, we simulate the data under the null hypothesis of zero correlation between u yx 2 and u x 1 x 2 by applying Y -permutation on the transformed model. The same procedure can be repeated to deal with other coe¢ cients of interest.
Another method, called semi-partialling, has been also proposed to deal with this case. We again partition the regressors into two groups X 1 on X 2 and regress X 1 on X 2 to obtain residuals u x 1 x 2 . We then replace X 1 with u x 1 x 2 in the regression. Regressing Y on u x 1 x 2 and X 2 yields the OLS coe¢ cients. The permutation method is then applied by permuting the u x 1 x 2 but keeping the Yi and X 2 i together. Some Monte Carlo simulations seem to suggest that semi-partialling yields better results (Dekker, Krackhardt & Snijders 2003) . Intutively, however, all three methods (Y -permutations, partialling and semi-partialling) should be asymptotically equivalent.
7 A freely available software called UCINET implements QAP on network data and o¤ers all three forms of permutations.
8 households derive most of their income from non-farm activities (Table 1) . There are many skilled artisans in this area, and their wood carvings, woven blankets, and rattan baskets supply a growing tourist and export trade. Unearned income -mostly land rentals -is not negligible but very unevenly distributed across households, as is often the case with asset income. Although nearly all households operate their own farm, the majority do not produce enough grain to meet annual consumption needs. Sales of crops and livestock account for a minute fraction of total income.
At the beginning of the survey, each household was asked to identify a number of individuals on which it could rely in case of need or to whom the respondent gives help when called upon to do so. Respondents listed on average 4.6 individuals, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 8.
These individuals constitute what we call the network of insurance partners of each household.
Approximately 939 network members are identi…ed by the survey. Of these, 189 or 20.1% are (members of) households already in the survey. In 68 of these cases, both respondents cite each other as network partners, resulting in 34 identi…able pairs of interlinked households. In the rest of the cases, only one respondent cited the other household as part of their network. This is not too surprising given the question that respondents were asked to answer: that A matters to B does not necessarily implies that B matters to A. Still, it serves as reminder that answers to the question do not capture all the relationships that respondents are involved in.
The network partners we have identi…ed probably constitute the nucleus of a larger, more di¤use network which is di¢ cult to quantify. Most insurance partners are close family members, e.g., children or siblings (Table 2 ) and most of them (63.3%) reside in the same village (barangay) (Table 3) .
Information was then collected on the characteristics of each household and on all debts and gifts. Respondents were asked to list all loans and transfers taking place within the last 9 three months of each survey round. Great care was taken to collect data on all possible in-kind payments and transfers, including crops, meals, and labor services. The identity of the partner was recorded for each transaction.
Empirical estimation

Network formation
We now turn to econometric analysis. We begin by estimating equation (2.4). De…nitions and descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the regressions are given in Table 4 . We consider six types of social and geographical distance. Geographical distance is measured by two variables. The …rst one is a dummy variable taking value 1 if both households i and j reside in the same 'sitio', a sub-division of a village. The second variable captures the di¤erence between i's and j's distance to the nearest road. Presumably, if both households are the same distance from the nearest road and reside in the same sitio, they are closer geographically. We expect that proximity reduces the cost of establishing and maintaining a link. To the extent that incomes are spatially correlated, it also reduces the potential for income pooling. But it opens more opportunities for helping each other in case of health shocks: proximity indeed makes it easier to provide home care, to comfort the bereaved, and to assist with visits to health facilities.
We focus on …ve dimensions of social distance: occupation, age, number of breadwinners, education, and wealth. We expect bene…ts from the pooling of income risk to be largest between people with di¤erent occupations, and especially high between farmers and non-farm workers.
Farming risk is primarily determined by weather conditions and pest infestation. Non-farm income risk, in contrast, is largely in ‡uenced by demand for crafts by traders and tourists visiting the area. Consequently we expect both sources of risk to be largely uncorrelated with each other. At the same time, both farming and non-farm incomes have a large collective risk component, making us suspect that income pooling within each occupation is fairly ine¤ective at reducing risk. Consequently, if income pooling is the main objective of surveyed households and the cost of forming links across occupations is not too high, we expect surveyed households to form risk sharing links primarily with people from other occupations. To capture these ideas, we construct two dummy variables. The …rst one takes value 1 if both households are primarily involved in non-farm activities. The second one takes value one if one household i's main occupation is farming while the household j's is not. The omitted category is when both households are primarily involved in farming activities. We expect the …rst (second) dummy to have a negative (positive) e¤ect on the probability of a link if bene…ts from risk sharing are stronger than costs.
As pointed out earlier, income pooling is not the only form that risk sharing can take. Taking care of the sick and elderly is another. Hence di¤erences in terms of age raise the potential for risk pooling: presumably, young households face quite di¤erent health risk from the elderly.
Di¤erences in age are also likely to be associated with di¤erences in lifestyle, perhaps reducing social interaction across groups. Again, if bene…ts from pooling risk across categories outweigh the cost of linking up, we expect more links between di¤erent groups. To capture this possibility, we include the absolute value of age di¤erence between i and j in the regression. We allow for the possibility that the direction of this di¤erence matters by introducing two variables within the set of regressors: the absolute value of age di¤erence between i and j if i is older than j (0 otherwise) and the absolute value of age di¤erence between i and j if i is younger than j (0 otherwise).
Education is included because it is a measure of social distance but also because it is a possible source of insurance. In poor societies such as the one we study, knowledge is valuable, particularly regarding contacts with the outside world (e.g., government authorities, cooperative bank, health facilities, traders, extension agents). To rural dwellers, educated households may thus be seen as providing some protection against abuse in dealings with the outside world. For this reason, we expect gains from risk sharing to be higher between households with di¤erent education levels. However, di¤erences in education level may also increase social distance and make socialization more di¢ cult (Mogues & Carter 2004) . To capture these ideas, we include the absolute value of the di¤erence in years of education between i and j. As for the age variable, we allow for the possibility that the direction of this di¤erence matters.
The remaining two measures of social distance are wealth and number of breadwinners. These two factors are thought to be important predictors of income: households with more working age adults, better education, and more wealth are probably richer. To to extent that absolute risk aversion is decreasing with income, as is customarily assumed, households with high average income are in a good position to o¤er insurance to poorer households (Fafchamps 1999) . Risk sharing may also have a redistribution component. For these two reasons, establishing links with richer households is probably very attractive to poor households. Rich households, in contrast, would see less need for links with poor households -or may not even see them as source of insurance. To capture these ideas, the absolute values of wealth di¤erence and of the di¤erence in the number of breadwinners are included in the regression in a way to allow for the possibility that i's relative position with respect to j matters.
It would have been useful to include a measure of relatedness between all households in the sample. Unfortunately, this information was only collected for linked households. Consequently, we cannot formally investigate whether family is a strong link determinant. To the extent that relatives reside near each other, geographical proximity may capture some relatedness e¤ects.
Regressions are estimated separately for the four villages in our sample. Coe¢ cient estimates, corrected standard errors and QAP p-values are presented in Table 5 . 8 Two sets of standard errors are reported: heteroskedasticity-corrected (robust) standard errors, and network-corrected (robust) standard errors. The z-statistic and p-value of individual coe¢ cients are based on network-corrected standard errors. We see that correcting standard errors for possible acrosssample correlation makes little di¤erence in terms of inference. Network-corrected standard errors are by and large of the same order of magnitude as uncorrected ones. In many cases, they are even smaller. This suggests little correlation in errors between observations relative to the same household. We also see that p-values obtained using QAP are generally in agreement with inference based on network corrected standard errors.
By far the strongest and most consistent link predictor is geographical proximity: the 'same sitio'dummy is positive and strongly signi…cant in all four villages while the di¤erence in road distance is negative in all four villages, signi…cantly so in three. The other strong systematic e¤ect is that of age: younger heads of household are more likely to mention a link with an older household. This e¤ect is signi…cant in three of the four villages.
The big surprise is occupation: contrary to expectations, in none of the regression is the 'farmer-no farmer'dummy signi…cant, implying that households primarily involved in farming activities are not more likely to be linked with people from other occupations.
Other variables do not appear to have any systematic e¤ect across villages. In village 1, households with lower education are more likely to be linked with more educated people. Wealthier households are less likely to be linked to poorer households in village 1 -and also in village 2 according to QAP results, but the e¤ect is not signi…cant in the other two villages. The number of breadwinners is strongly signi…cant in village 4, but with the wrong sign: households with fewer breadwinners appear less likely to be linked with households with more breadwinners. It is also signi…cant in village 3 according to QAP results, suggesting that households with more breadwinners are less likely to be linked with households with fewer breadwinners.
Taken together, these results suggest that, in our study area, the bene…ts from sharing risk across occupations are not strong enough to outweigh the costs. The results …t the idea that the pooling of health risk is the dominant concern of respondents. This is consistent with the work of Fafchamps & Lund (2003) who show that health risk -and especially mortality riskis the leading motivation behind gifts and transfers in the study area.
Bene…ts from network links
Having investigated the determinants of network formation, we now test whether links actually provide bene…ts. To this e¤ect, we estimate a model of the form:
where B ij is a yet-to-be-de…ned bene…t ‡owing from j to i, L ij as before is a dummy variable denoting the existence of a network link, and the d k ij 's are the distance variables entering regression (2.4) in Table 2 Two types of ‡ows are examined here: gifts and loans. Fafchamps & Lund (2003) have
shown that, in the study area, informal loans and gifts play an important risk sharing function. Fafchamps & Gubert (2002) have further demonstrated that loan repayment is also made contingent on shocks a¤ecting borrowers. This is primarily achieved by setting zero interest rate on most informal loans, forgiving interest rate in case of late payment, and letting borrowers repay in labor. It is therefore reasonable to examine whether gifts and loans indeed are more likely 14 between households who claim to in a risk sharing relationship.
For this test to be valid, we need to control for geographical and social distance. Indeed, even if networks played no role in actual risk sharing, distance may still a¤ect gift and loan ‡ows. Failing to control for distance would result in omitted variable bias since we already know that L ij is a¤ected by distance.
Regression results are presented in Table 6 for gifts and Table 7 for loans. In both cases the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value 1 if a gift (loan) took place between i and j over the survey period. As before, we correct standard errors for possible network correlation and we also report QAP p-values. Table 6 This suggests that gifts may have a ritual nature tied to traditional values which are presumably surviving better in households with a strong tie to the land. This interpretation is consistent with anthropological evidence from the study area (e.g. Conklin 1980 , Barton 1969 , Russell 1987 , Milgram 1999 ). It also is in line with the observation made by Fafchamps & Lund (2003) Regression results for loans are presented in Table 7 . Again we …nd overwhelming evidence that the likelihood of receiving a loan is much higher in the presence of a pre-existing risk sharing link. Geographical proximity also appears to play a decisive role, with the 'same sitio' dummy positive in all four villages and signi…cant in three (including with QAP). The di¤erence in road distance is similarly negative in all villages, signi…cantly so in two. This suggests that surveyed households are more likely to obtain loans from neighbors even if they did not beforehand consider themselves connected to them. Other regressors again show no clear pattern.
It is immediately clear from the results reported in
Households with more breadwinners appear more likely to receive a loan in villages 3 and 4, strangely suggesting that households with more income earning potential borrow more. In the two same villages, younger heads of household are less likely to receive a loan from older heads.
Neither the number of breadwinners nor age has signi…cant e¤ect in the other two villages.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the formation of risk sharing networks. It is indeed increasingly recognized that informal risk sharing plays a major role in the way the rural poor deal with risk (e.g. Rosenzweig 1988 , Townsend 1994 , Ligon, Thomas & Worrall 2001 and that interpersonal networks facilitate informal risk sharing (e.g. Fafchamps 1992 , Dercon & de Weerdt 2002 , Fafchamps & Lund 2003 , Dercon & Krishnan 2000 .
In the conceptual section, we argued that social and geographic distance between households often raises the potential bene…ts from risk pooling but also the cost of establishing and maintaining interpersonal links. The net e¤ect of distance on link formation is therefore theoretically 16 indeterminate since it depends on the net e¤ect on the di¤erence between bene…ts and costs. If costs rise su¢ ciently rapidly with distance, the pooling of risk across households with di¤erent income pro…les will not be achieved. The e¢ ciency of informal risk pooling thus depends on the way risk sharing networks are formed.
We investigated this issue empirically using a speci…cally designed survey in rural Philippines.
We examined which dimensions of social and geographical distance predict the existence of risk sharing relationships. We found that geographic proximity is a major determinant of interpersonal relationships. Age also plays an important role. We interpret our …ndings as evidence that risk sharing relationships are created more with health shocks than income smoothing in mind.
This stands in contradiction with much of the literature which has focused nearly exclusively on income risk.
We also …nd that households are much likely to receive a gift or loan from someone with whom they had a pre-existing relationship, controlling for other proximity factors. Most gifts and informal loans are thus embedded in interpersonal relationships that are largely determined by geographical proximity factors and are only weakly the result of purposeful diversi…cation of income risk.
Some readers will perhaps argue that our results are unsurprising. This may be so. But the literature on risk sharing has often ignored these simple realities of village life. Villagers do not appear to purposefully form links with individuals who either have a di¤erent income pro…le or who have enough wealth and human capital to assist them. In these conditions, it is hardly surprising that e¢ cient income risk sharing has consistently been rejected among the rural poor.
Having found why e¢ ciency is not achieved, the challenge is now to …nd ways of encouraging risk pooling across income pro…les and wealth levels. 
Number of observations 206
(1) Includes rental income, pensions and sale of some assets (2) In terms of number of animals, fowl counts for 68%, pigs for 16%, cattle and goats for 1%, and other animals for 14%.
The total average value of livestock is 2,605 Pesos and the corresponding coefficient of variation is 1.85. Note. An insurance partner is a close relative when he is a son/daughter, a son/daughter in law, a grandchild, a parent or a brother/sister. He is a distant relative when he is a nephew/niece or a cousin/aunt/uncle 
